Jurisprudential and Rational Dimensions of Tajarri (Audacity) in Islamic Criminal Law Practices

Abstract

This article explores Ayatollah Sayyid Taqi al-Tabataba’i al-Qummi’s treatment of Tajarri in Arā’unā fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh. In Usuli terminology, Tajarri occurs when a legally accountable person deliberately performs an act in defiance of what they have come to believe—conclusively and sincerely—that it is a divine prohibition, even though the act is not in fact forbidden in reality (for example, drinking what one believes to be wine that is actually water). The study addresses two closely related questions: (1) whether an agent’s mistaken certainty after forming the evidential basis changes the legal status of the act, and (2) whether the agent thereby acquires a rational basis for punishment. Through doctrinal and close textual analysis, the article reconstructs al-Qummi’s account of the act’s legal standing and the agent’s culpability. It finds that al-Qummi rejects the idea—under this principle—that rationally recognised blameworthiness automatically entails a corresponding Sharia prohibition of the act. Consequently, the agent’s incorrect belief does not convert an otherwise permissible act into a prohibited one. At the same time, the article argues that al-Qummi holds the agent rationally liable to punishment, because the conduct expresses rebellion against divine authority and a conscious challenge to it. The basis of blame thus lies in the agent’s culpable stance and manifested defiance, rather than in any change in the act’s objective ruling. Finally, rather than asserting a structural equivalence, the article compares this distinction with the structural analogs of impossible attempt in modern criminal law; it notes that while there is a certain functional analogy to the agent’s culpable subjective state, al-Qummi’s theological-jurisprudential framework remains conceptually distinct and does not translate into positive criminal liability under modern substantive law.