An Examination of the Influence of Traditionalism on the Role of ‘Aql in Contemporary Islamic Legal Thought

Abstract

In the contemporary period, the emergence of unprecedented pressures from science, human rights, nation-state codification, and artificial intelligence-related issues would ordinarily expand the scope for the application of reason (‘aql) in Islamic law. However, in practice, the role of ‘aql remains largely subservient in the order of Islamic legal authority. While classical and reformist literature on ‘aql is extensive, there is a gap in systematically examining how traditionalism actively shapes the application of ‘aql in contemporary Islamic legal thought. Adopting doctrinal methodology, the paper examines the classical understanding of the role of ‘aql as defined by major Muslim theorists and the implications of this influence for ijtihād and reason. The paper finds that the application of ‘aql remains tightly restricted due to the sustained influence of traditionalism in contemporary Islamic legal thought. Some traditionalist scholars and institutions continue to interpret classical jurisprudence in ways that limit ijtihād, restrict qiyās, and subordinate maqāṣid to literalism. Consequently, despite new challenges, contemporary traditionalist discourse continues to confine ‘aql to an explanatory and subservient role rather than an independent source of legislation. It is recommended that a re-evaluation is needed within traditionalist circles to distinguish between essential methodological controls and rigid literalism. There should be a disciplined framework for applying maqāṣid-based reasoning that remains grounded in naṣṣ but allows for broader engagement with new challenges.